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Perhaps  the  strongest  argument  for  scientific  realism,  the  no-­‐‑miracles-­‐‑argument,  has  
been  said  to  commit  the  so-­‐‑called  base  rate  fallacy.  The  apparent  elusiveness  of  the  
base  rate  of  true  theories  has  even  been  said  to  undermine  the  rationality  of  the  entire  
realism  debate.  In  this  paper,  I  confront  this  challenge  by  arguing,  on  the  basis  of  the  
Kuhnian   picture   of   theory   choice,   that   a   theory   is   likely   to   be   true   if   it   possesses  
multiple  theoretical  virtues  and  is  embraced  by  numerous  scientists,  even  when  the  
base  rate  converges  to  zero.        
Key  words:  scientific  realism;  no  miracle  argument;  base  rate  fallacy;  theoretical  
virtues;  T.S.  Kuhn;  theory  choice;  convergence;  witness  testimony.  
1   Introduction	  
The  perhaps  strongest  argument  for  scientific  realism,  the  No-­‐‑Miracles-­‐‑Argument  
(NMA),  has  it  that  it  would  be  a  miracle  if  our  theories  were  as  successful  as  they  are,  
and  not  be  true.  As  Howson  (2000)  pointed  out,  however,  as  normally  stated,  the  
NMA  commits  the  so-­‐‑called  base  rate  fallacy:  it  ignores  the  base  rate  of  true  theories.  
Expressed  in  Bayesian  terms,  it  ignores  the  dependence  of  the  posterior  probability  
of  a  successful  theory  being  true  on  the  prior  probability  of  a  theory  being  true.  But  
setting  the  base  rates  seems  elusive.  If  probabilities  are  construed  objectively,  then  it  
looks  as  though  we  have  no  way  of  finding  out  about  them.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  
probabilities  are  construed  subjectively,  then  both  the  realist  and  antirealist  can  set  
the  priors  as  they  please.  A  rational  debate  about  realism  is  therefore  impossible  
(Magnus  and  Callender  2004).    
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  severity  of  Magnus  and  Callender’s  challenge  is  
widely  appreciated,  head-­‐‑on  confrontations  of  their  claims  have  been  few  and  far  
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between.1  Whilst  the  current  paper  does  little  to  undermine  Magnus  and  Callender’s  
fundamental  point,  it  will  nevertheless,  in  the  face  of  it,  try  to  tilt  the  balance  to  the  
realist’s  favour  on  the  basis  of  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory-­‐‑choice.  In  particular,  it  
will  be  argued  on  the  basis  of  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory  choice  that  a  theory  is  
likely  to  be  true,  even  when  the  base  rate  converges  to  zero,  if  it  possesses  multiple  
theoretical  virtues  and  if  it  is  embraced  by  numerous  scientists  on  the  basis  of  its  
virtues.            
Although  the  paper  will  assume  large  parts  of  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory-­‐‑
choice,  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  not  exegetical.  That  is,  the  purpose  of  this  paper  
is  not  to  reconstruct  Kuhn’s  view  of  theory-­‐‑choice  in  a  way  that  makes  best  sense  of  
his  view  in  the  context  of  his  other  works.  Rather,  the  paper  will  seek  to  explore  
some  interesting  implications  given  (some  parts  of)  the  Kuhnian  framework  of  theory  
choice.2  The  view  defended  here  may  thus  very  well  be  detrimental  to  some  of  the  
views  held  by  Kuhn.3      
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  specifies  Magnus  and  Callender’s  
challenge.  Section  3  outlines  how  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory  choice  provides  the  
resources  for  generating  an  argument  for  realism  via  the  convergence  of  scientists’  
truth  judgements  about  theories  on  the  basis  of  those  theories’  virtues.  I  refer  to  this  
argument  as  NO-­‐‑VIRTUE-­‐‑COINCIDENCE-­‐‑ARGUMENT  (NVC).  Section  4  develops  a  formal  
apparatus  for  the  NVC  with  the  help  of  Earman’s  Bayesian  rendering  of  the  
convergence  of  witness  reports.  Section  5  spells  out  this  apparatus  for  the  NVC  in  
detail.  Section  6  proposes  a  way  to  estimate  the  error  rates  regarding  scientists’  truth  
judgements.  Section  7  addresses  some  possible  objections  to  my  argument  and  
provides  further  clarification.  Section  8  concludes  the  paper.        
2   Magnus	  and	  Callender’s	  challenge	  
Magnus  and  Callender  distinguish  between  ‘wholesale’  and  ‘retail’  arguments  for  
realism,  i.e.,  arguments  about  “all  or  most  of  the  entities  posited  in  our  best  scientific  
theories”  and  arguments  about  “specific  kinds  of  things,  such  as  neutrinos”,  
                                                                                                 
1  See  for  example  (Psillos  2009)  and  a  reply  by  (Howson  2013).  For  another  recent  attempt  see  (Menke  
2013).  
2  In  this  sense,  this  paper  is  inspired  by  a  recent  paper  by  Okasha  (2011).  
3  In  particular,  much  of  Kuhn’s  work  is  hardly  reconcilable  with  realism,  which  will  be  defended  here.  
In  Section  3  I  will  outline  in  detail  which  parts  of  Kuhn’s  account  I  intend  to  use  in  this  paper.  Should  
any  reader  with  a  stake  in  the  scholarship  on  Kuhn  object  to  my  interpretation,  I  invite  them  to  
consider  my  assumptions  in  abstract  terms  and  to  ignore  any  reference  to  Kuhn.    
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respectively  (321).  While  they  think  that  there  may  be  good  grounds  for  defending  
retail  arguments,  they  urge  that  “the  wholesale  realism  debate  should  be  dissolved”,  
for  wholesale  arguments  amount  to  no  more  than  “adamant,  futile  table  thumping”  
(322).4  Their  skepticism  is  grounded  in  their  claim  that  realists  and  antirealists  alike  
commit  the  base  rate  fallacy.  
   The  base  rate  fallacy  can  be  illustrated  with  a  simple  example  from  the  
medical  context.  Suppose  we  were  to  test  the  presence  of  some  disease  T  in  a  
population  of  subjects  with  a  very  effective  test.  That  test,  suppose,  would  have  a  
very  high  probability  of  indicating  to  us  the  presence  of  a  disease,  when  the  disease  
is  really  present  in  a  subject.  Let  us  refer  to  a  positive  test  result  as  e.  Expressed  
formally,  then,  𝑃 𝑒 𝑇 ≫ 0.  Suppose  further  that  the  test  has  a  very  low  false  positive  
rate.  That  is,  the  test  is  unlikely  to  indicate  the  presence  of  the  disease  when  it  is  
actually  absent  (𝑃 𝑒 ¬𝑇 ≪ 1).  For  concreteness’s  sake,  assume  that  𝑃 𝑒 𝑇 = 1  and  𝑃 𝑒 ¬𝑇 = .05.  Contrary  to  many  people’s  intuitions,  it  would  then  be  fallacious  to  
infer  that  the  probability  of  some  subject  having  the  disease,  when  the  test  indicates  
that  the  subject  has  it  (𝑃 𝑇 𝑒 ),  is  high,  for  example  .95.  In  fact,  it  can  be  rather  low.  If  
the  disease  is  very  rare  in  the  population  (i.e.,	  𝑃(𝑇) ≪ 1),  for  example  1/1000  then,  
given  the  effectiveness  of  our  test,  we  would  expect  51  subjects  to  test  positive.  
Because,  by  assumption,  only  one  of  those  actually  has  the  disease,  𝑃 𝑇 𝑒   would  be  
just  .02,  that  is,  much  lower  than  the  intuitive  .95.    
Magnus  and  Callender  accuse  the  partakers  in  the  realism  debate  of  having  
made  the  same  mistake.  That  is,  they  accuse  realists  and  antirealists  of  having  
neglected  the  base  rate  of  true  theories  in  the  pool  of  all  theories  /  the  prior  
probability  of  a(ny)  theory  being  true.5  Instead  the  debate  has  focused  on  the  
probability  of  a  theory  being  false  if  successful  𝑃 ¬𝑇 𝑒 ,  and  the  likelihood  of  e  given  
¬𝑇  (i.e.,  the  false  positive  rate  𝑃 𝑒 ¬𝑇 ),  where  𝑃(𝑇)  now  is  to  be  interpreted  as  the  
probability  of  a  theory  being  true  and  𝑃(𝑒)  as  the  probability  of  a  theory  being  
successful.  Whereas  antirealists  have  sought  to  increase  𝑃 ¬𝑇 𝑒   with  arguments  like  
the  Pessimistic  Meta  Induction,  realists  have  tried  to  decrease  𝑃 𝑒 ¬𝑇   by  restricting  
                                                                                                 
4  Dicken  (2013)  has  pointed  out  that  retail  arguments  risk  losing  sight  of  the  philosophical  substance  
of  the  realism  debate.  
5  Magnus  and  Callender’s  contribution  can  be  seen  as  a  synthesis  of  earlier  points  made  by  Howson  
(2000)  and  Lewis  (2001).  
Page  4  of  22  
  
the  notion  of  success  to  novel  success  (327).6  But  without  knowledge  of  the  base  rate,  
engaging  in  arguments  about  the  posteriors  appears  meaningless.  
Although  Magnus  and  Callender  believe  that  their  challenge  is  equally  futile  
to  realists  and  antirealists,  they  pose  the  following  dilemma  to  the  realist:    
Either  there  is  a  way  of  knowing  the  approximate  base  rate  of  truth  among  our  current  
theories  or  there  is  not.  If  there  is,  then  we  must  have  some  independent  grounds  for  thinking  
that  a  theory  is  very  likely  true;  yet  if  we  had  such  grounds,  the  no-­‐‑miracles  argument  would  
be  superfluous.  If  there  is  not,  then  the  no-­‐‑miracles  argument  requires  an  assumption  that  
some  significant  proportion  of  our  current  theories  are  [sic]  true;  yet  that  would  beg  the  
question  against  the  anti-­‐‑realist.  (328)  
Because  they  see  no  way  out  of  the  dilemma,  Magnus  and  Callender  conclude  that  
the  entire  wholesale  realism  debate  is  an  irrational  debate,  which  better  be  dissolved:  
Without  independent  methods  for  estimating  crucial  base  rates,  there  is  little  to  do  but  make  
arguments  that  beg  the  question.  Wholesale  realism  debates  persist  not  due  to  mere  
stubbornness,  but  because  there  is  no  reason  for  opponents  to  disagree  (336;  original  
emphasis).7    
Although  I  think  Magnus  and  Callender  are  correct  in  their  diagnosis,  the  
consequences  of  their  insight  can  be  alleviated  and  the  second  horn  of  their  dilemma  
be  rejected:  for  the  no-­‐‑miracles-­‐‑argument  to  go  through,  the  base  rate  of  true  theories  
need  not  be  high.8  In  fact,  they  may  even  approach  zero.  In  order  to  present  the  
argument  to  this  effect,  we  will  first  of  all  have  to  set  up  the  theoretical  framework  in  
which  I  intend  to  make  the  argument.      
3   Kuhnian	  theory	  choice	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  virtue	  convergence	  
In  his  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions  (1962/1996),  T.S.  Kuhn  claimed  that  
paradigm  change,  such  as  the  change  from  Newtonian  to  relativistic  mechanics,  or  
from  the  phlogiston  to  the  oxygen  theory  of  combustion,  “cannot  be  …  forced  by  
logic  [or]  neutral  experience”  (149).  Rather  each  paradigm  comes  with  its  own  set  of  
evaluation  criteria.  Whenever  scientists  have  to  choose  between  paradigms,  “each  
paradigm  will  be  shown  to  satisfy  more  or  less  the  criteria  that  it  dictates  for  itself  
                                                                                                 
6  𝑃 ¬𝑇 𝑒   and  𝑃 𝑒 ¬𝑇   are  related  by  Bayes’  theorem:  𝑃 ¬𝑇 𝑒 = . 𝑒 ¬𝑇 ×.(¬0).(1) .  
7  Similarly,  when  the  probabilities  are  interpreted  as  subjective  probabilities,  Magnus  and  Callender  
also  “can’t  imagine  how  one  could  find  a  reasonable  set  of  priors”  (329).    
8  See  the  first  quotation  above:  “a  significant  proportion  of  our  current  theories  [must  be]  true”.  See  also  
Magnus  and  Callender’s  p.  325  (end  of  the  second  last  paragraph).      
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and  to  fall  short  of  a  few  of  those  dictated  by  its  opponent”  (109).  In  other  words,  
paradigm  change  is  circular  in  the  sense  that  changing  a  paradigm  must  rely  on  the  
evaluation  criteria  that  the  new  paradigm  identifies  as  important  (and  which  will  be  
different  from  the  criteria  identified  as  important  by  the  old  paradigm).  About  ten  
years  after  Structure  Kuhn  tried  to  answer  those  who  (rightly)  accused  him  of  
putting  the  case  for  relativism  in  a  seminal  paper  on  theory  choice  (Kuhn  1977).  
Departing  from  Structure  to  a  degree  that  he  probably  did  not  quite  realize,  Kuhn  in  
this  paper  advanced  the  view  that  there  is  a  standard  set  of  theoretical  virtues  on  the  
basis  of  which  theories  have  been  assessed  by  scientists.  Kuhn,  without  claiming  
either  originality  or  completeness,  mentions  five  prominent  virtues:  empirical  
accuracy,  (internal  and  external)  consistency,  scope,  simplicity,  and  fertility.9    
Kuhn—slightly  reluctantly—distinguished  between  an  objective  and  subjective  
element  of  theory  choice  (359).  The  former  concerns  the  set  of  virtues  involved  in  
theory  choice.  Kuhn  writes:  “the  criteria  or  values  deployed  in  theory  choice  [i.e.,  the  
virtues]  are  fixed  once  and  for  all,  unaffected  by  their  participation  in  transitions  
from  one  theory  to  another”  (Kuhn  1977,  364).  Although  Kuhn  assigned  universality  
to  the  five  standard  theoretical  virtues,  he  believed  that  there  was  a  lot  of  room  for  
legitimate  disagreement  among  practitioners  in  deciding  which  theory  to  adopt.  This  
constitutes  the  subjective  element  of  theory  choice.  Each  scientist,  Kuhn  claims,  has  
different  weighting  preferences  concerning  the  standard  theory  choice  criteria.  
Whereas  some  prefer  simpler  theories,  for  instance,  others  prefer  more  unified  
theories,  and  so  on.10  It  is  this  subjective  element  that  led  Kuhn  to  the  conclusion  that  
there  is  ‘no  neutral  algorithm’  for  theory  choice  to  which  all  practitioners  would  be  
bound  (Kuhn  1977,  199).  Thus,  “two  men  fully  committed  to  the  same  list  of  criteria  
for  choice  may  nevertheless  reach  different  conclusions”  (Kuhn  1977,  358).  The  
subjective  element  of  theory  choice,  however,  does  not  imply  that  theory  choice  
would  be  arbitrary.  The  standard  criteria  of  theory  choice  are  not  projections;  they  
map  onto  actual  theory  properties.  Theories  really  are  accurate,  consistent,  fertile,  
and  so  on,  or  they  are  not.    
                                                                                                 
9  Theoretical  virtues  are  also  sometimes  denoted  as  ‘values’.  In  fact  Kuhn  himself  suggested  that  label.  
I  prefer  ‘virtues’  because  ‘values’  have  ethical  connotations.  Recently  there  has  been  a  debate  about  the  
virtues   of   the   scientists   making   theory-­‐‑choice   (Stump   2007,   Ivanova   2010).   My   discussion   instead  
focuses  on  the  virtues  of  theories.    
10  Although  Kuhn  thought  the  five  standard  virtues  are  relevant  to  theory  choice  throughout  the  
history  of  science,  he  thought  that  ‘application  of  these  values’  and  the  ‘relative  weights  attached  to  
them’  changed  (364-­‐‑5).    
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Another  remark  by  Kuhn  seems  to  undermine  the  objective  element  in  theory  
choice:  theoretical  virtues  are  ‘imprecise’  or  ‘ambiguous’.  By  that  he  meant  that  
different  practitioners  might  refer  to  different  properties  of  a  theory  with  the  same  
term.  For  example,  one  practitioner  might  refer  to  quantitative  parsimony  and  
another  to  qualitative  parsimony  when  calling  the  theory  ‘simple’.  For  example,  one  
practitioner  might  judge  the  Copernican  system  of  the  planets  simpler  because  it  
represents  the  retrogressive  motion  in  simple  terms,  and  another  practitioner  might  
judge  the  Ptolemaic  system  as  simple  as  the  Copernican  system,  because  the  
Copernican  system,  too,  made  use  of  a  large  amount  of  epicycles  (Kuhn  1957).11  Yet  
this  problem  should  constitute  no  major  obstacle  for  theory  choice:  barring  the  much  
criticized  Kuhnian  communication  failures,  practitioners  should  be  able  to  specify  to  
their  peers  what  properties  they  are  referring  to.  Practitioners  might  then  still  
disagree  about  how  these  two  kinds  of  simplicity  ought  to  be  weighted,  of  course.  
The  ambiguity  problem  thus  arguably  reduces  to  the  weighting  problem  (Okasha  
2011).12    
A  similar  point  can  be  made  with  regards  to  empirical  accuracy.  In  a  theory-­‐‑
choice  situation,  one  theory  might  be  empirically  accurate  with  regards  to  one  set  of  
evidence,  and  another  theory  might  be  empirically  accurate  with  regards  to  another  
set  of  evidence.  In  such  a  case,  we  would  of  course  have  to  fine-­‐‑grain  the  virtue  of  
empirical  accuracy.  Scientists  may  then  disagree  as  to  whether  one  or  the  other  data  
set  is  to  be  given  preference  when  it  comes  to  the  choice  between  the  two  theories.    
The  weighting  problem  is  contingent  on  another  part  of  the  Kuhnian  picture  
of  theory  choice.  According  to  Kuhn,  as  a  matter  of  empirical  fact,  the  virtues  
“repeatedly  prove  to  conflict  with  one  other”  (357).  In  other  words,  as  a  matter  of  
empirical  fact,  theories  repeatedly  do  better  than  others  with  regard  to  some  criteria,  
but  worse  with  regard  to  others.  For  convenience  let  us  refer  to  this  claim  as  
‘CONFLICT’.  When  there  is  CONFLICT,  and  when  scientists  have  different  weighting  
preferences,  there  will  be  diverging  theory  choices.    
                                                                                                 
11   The   precise   number   of   epicycles   used   depends   on   which   version   of   the   Ptolemaic   system   one  
compares  to  Copernican  system  to.  For  an  informative  discussion  see  Palter  (1970).  
12  Some  readers  suggested  to  me  that  Kuhn  believed  that  the  virtues  were  intrinsically  and  inextricably  
vague,  with  no  disambiguation  being  possible.  I  have  found  no  evidence  in  Kuhn’s  text  for  this  
suggestion.  Regardless,  disambiguation  of  theoretical  virtues  may  not  always  be  unequivocal,  of  
course.  There  may  be  boundary  cases.  But  boundary  cases  do  not  necessarily  imply  that  we  cannot  
reach  agreement.  In  our  everyday  life,  for  example,  we  pretty  successfully  manage  to  agree  on  what  
we  consider  to  be  a  bald  person,  in  spite  of  baldness  being  a  standard  example  for  a  vague  predicate.    
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CONFLICT  can  also  occur  within  the  category  of  one  particular  virtue.  Take  for  
example  empirical  accuracy.  One  theory  may  perform  better  with  regard  to  one  set  
of  data,  and  another  theory  better  with  regard  to  another  set  of  data.  Scientists  with  
different  preferences  will  end  up  choosing  different  theories.  This  is  another  reason  
for  why  Kuhn  thinks  theory  choice  is  often  indeterminate  (357).  Again,  the  
‘subjective’  element  of  theory  choice,  i.e.,  the  interests  and  preferences  of  the  
investigator,  will  influence  which  data  set  an  individual  will  assign  greater  weight,  
and  accordingly,  which  theory  she  will  end  up  choosing.    
Interestingly,  and  somewhat  counterintuitively,  CONFLICT,  can  explain  theory  
choice  convergence.  Again,  CONFLICT  is  an  empirical  thesis.  That  is,  at  least  prima  
facie,  there  is  nothing  intrinsic  in  the  virtues  or  their  relationships  that  would  cause  
CONFLICT.  There  therefore  should  be  situations  in  which  there  are  theories  that  do  
better  with  regard  to  any  virtue.  In  that  case,  the  subjective  element  of  theory  choice,  
which  Kuhn  was  so  keen  to  stress,  simply  cancels  out:  If  I  prefer  simple  theories  and  
you  prefer  unified  theories,  then  we  will  adopt  different  theories  when  there  is  no  
theory  that  has  both  of  these  properties.  But  when  there  is  a  theory  that  is  both  
simple  and  unified  and  its  competitors  are  not,  then  we  will  end  up  choosing  the  
same  theory  despite  our  diverging  preferences.13    
Perhaps  even  more  interestingly,  CONFLICT  offers  a  new  argument  for  realism.  
Roughly,  it  goes  like  this:  if  CONFLICT  is  true  and  there  are  only  sometimes  theories  
that  exhibit  several  or  even  all  of  the  standard  virtues,  then  it  would  be  a  strange  
coincidence  if  a  theory  had  all  the  five  virtues,  be  embraced  by  all  scientists,  but  not  
be  true.  It  is  easy  to  see:  just  like  the  standard  NMA  for  realism,  this  is  a  no-­‐‑
coincidence  (NC)  argument.  I  will  therefore  refer  to  it  as  the  no-­‐‑virtue-­‐‑coincidence  
(NVC)  argument.  And  yet,  as  I  will  argue,  it  is  more  powerful  than  the  NMA:  it  offers  
an  answer  to  Magnus  and  Callender’s  challenge.    
Before  proceeding,  however,  let  us  note  that  CONFLICT  does  seem  to  possess  a  
good  deal  of  prior  plausibility.  If  it  was  easy  to  construct  theories  that  possessed  all  
of  the  standard  virtues,  and  most  of  the  theories  we  come  up  with  possessed  all  of  
the  standard  virtues,  then  a  theory  possessing  all  of  the  virtues  wouldn’t  warrant  it  
being  singled  out  as  a  hopeful  truth-­‐‑candidate.  At  the  same  time,  scientists  would  
have  a  hard  time  making  their  theory-­‐‑choices  when  faced  with  a  range  of  theories  
                                                                                                 
13  Kuhn,  in  his  seminal  article  on  theory-­‐‑choice,  firmly  focussed  his  attention  on  disagreement.  All  he  
did  write   about   agreement  was   that   “much  work,   both   theoretical   and   experimental,   is   ordinarily  
required   before   the   new   theory   can   display   sufficient   accuracy   and   scope   to   generate   widespread  
conviction”  (363).    
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that  would  all  score  highly  on  all  dimensions  of  theory  choice.  But  very  often,  
scientists  do  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  what  theory  to  embrace.  Although  CONFLICT  
thus  does  seem  plausible,  it  is  of  course  an  open  question  how  frequent  it  is  that  only  
few  theories  or  only  one  theory  at  a  time  possesses  all  the  standard  virtues.  This  
question  is  an  empirical  one  and  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article.  For  the  purposes  of  
this  paper  we  shall  see,  however,  the  answer  to  this  question  will  not  matter.    
4   Earman	  convergence	  
Although  clearly  related,  the  NVC  differs  from  the  NMA  in  that  it  appeals  to  the  
persuasive  power  of  the  convergence  of  several  independent  information  sources.  
Whereas  the  NMA  exploits  the  fact  that  there  are  so  many  ways  in  which  a  theory  
could  have  been  wrong,  the  class  of  arguments  of  which  the  NVC  is  a  member  banks  
on  the  fact  there  are  so  many  ways  in  which  each  information  source  could  have  
produced  a  result  inconsistent  with  the  other  sources.  Several  philosophers  have  
used  related  ‘convergence’  arguments.  Arguing  against  the  thesis  of  theory-­‐‑
ladenness  of  observation,  for  instance,  Hacking  (1983)  pointed  out  that  it  would  be  a  
strange  coincidence  if  several  of  our  instruments  (e.g.  the  light  and  the  electron  
microscope),  presupposing  different  background  theories,  were  to  produce  the  same  
data,  if  the  data  were  not  correct.  Likewise,  Salmon  (1984)  pointed  out  that  it  would  
be  an  inexplicable  coincidence  if  J.-­‐‑B.  Perrin’s  half-­‐‑dozen  experiments  in  1911  all  had  
produced  the  same  value  of  Avogadro’s  number  and  that  number  had  not  been  
correct  (see  also  Cartwright  1983,  van  Fraassen  2009,  Chalmers  2011,  Psillos  2011).14  
These  ‘convergence’  arguments  are  in  fact  analogous  to  arguments  for  the  
trustworthiness  of  witness  reports  in  the  case  of  several  independent  witnesses  
reporting  the  same  murderer:  we’d  be  compelled  to  believe  that  several  witnesses  
tell  the  truth  if  they  independently  of  each  other  report  the  same  murderer  (i.e.,  
without  coordinating  their  beliefs)—even  when  the  individual  reliability  of  the  
witnesses  is  poor.  C.I.  Lewis  (1946)  concludes  that  “this  agreement  [between  witness  
reports]  is  highly  unlikely;  the  story  any  one  false  witness  might  tell  being  one  out  of  
so  very  large  a  number  of  equally  possible  choices”  (246).  In  other  words,  the  
probability  that  there  is  convergence  in  the  witness  reports  makes  it  unlikely  that  the  
witness  reports  are  unreliable.  I  will  argue  below  that  a  theory  possessing  all  of  the  
                                                                                                 
14  For  a  more  general  discussion  about  robustness  arguments  in  science  see  (Hudson  2013).  Some  
antirealists  have  taken  the  view  that  coincidences  need  not  be  explained  (cf.  van  Fraassen  1980).  In  the  
face  of  there  being  a  plausible  explanation  being  available,  I  personally  would  regard  such  a  move  
irrational.  Yet  the  issue  would  lead  us  too  far  astray  to  take  this  up  in  any  more  depth  on  this  
occasion.    
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Kuhnian  virtues,  and  being  judged  true  on  the  basis  of  its  virtues  by  the  scientific  
community  accordingly,  is  analogous  to  independent  witnesses  all  reporting  the  
same  murderer.  
The  intuitive  persuasive  power  of  convergent  witness  reports  can  be  made  
precise  by  employing  Bayes’s  theorem  (Earman  2000).  Let  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇   represent  the  
probability  that  a  witness  i  gives  a  report  V  that  a  crime  T  happened  when  that  crime  
actually  happened,  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇   the  probability  that  a  witness  reports  a  crime  when  the  
crime  did  not  happen,  and  𝑃 𝑇   the  prior  probability  of  the  crime  itself.15  Assuming  
that  the  witnesses  are  equally  reliable  and  independent,  the  following  equalities  hold  𝑃 𝑉5 ∩ …∩	  𝑉8 = 𝑃 𝑉5 ∙ 𝑃 𝑉: ∙ …	  ∙ 𝑃 𝑉8 = 𝑃 𝑉 8  𝑃 𝑉5 ∩ …∩	  𝑉8|𝑇 = 𝑃(𝑉5|𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝑉:|𝑇) ∙ … ∙ 𝑃(𝑉8|𝑇) 	  = 𝑃(𝑉|𝑇)8  𝑃 𝑉5 ∩ …∩	  𝑉8|¬𝑇 = 𝑃(𝑉5|¬𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝑉:|¬𝑇) ∙ … ∙ 𝑃 𝑉8 ¬𝑇 = 𝑃(𝑉|¬𝑇)8.  
The  posterior  probability  of  the  truth  of  a  report  given  n  witnesses  making  the  same  
observations,  by  Bayes’s  theorem,  is    
𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 = 11 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑇𝑃 𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 𝑉5 ¬𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 𝑉: ¬𝑇 ∙ … ∙ 	  𝑃 𝑉8 ¬𝑇𝑃 𝑉5 𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 𝑉: 𝑇 ∙ … ∙ 	  𝑃 𝑉8 𝑇   
which,  assuming  equally  reliable  witnesses,  reduces  to    
𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 = 11 + 1 − 𝑃(𝑇)𝑃(𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝑉3|¬𝑇)𝑃(𝑉3|𝑇) 8  
Let  us  refer  to  this  equation  as  the  Earman  convergence  equation.    
Earman  points  out  that  for  the  occurrence  of  a  crime  to  be  likely  given  all  the  
witness  reports,  the  witnesses  need  not  be  reliable  in  the  absolute  sense.  All  that  is  
required,  rather,  is  that  the  witness  reports  be  reliable  in  the  relative  sense,  so  that  𝑃(𝑉3|¬𝑇)  <  𝑃(𝑉3|𝑇),  since  in  that  case  as  n  ®  ¥,   .(>?|¬0).(>?|0) 8  ®  0,  and  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8   ®  1,  
regardless  of  how  low  𝑃 𝑇 .    
                                                                                                 
15  Earman  also  conditionalises  on  the  witnesses  background  knowledge  and  evidence,  which  I’ll  leave  
out  here  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  Earman  also  develops  the  argument  with  regards  to  the  occurrence  
of  miracles,  instead  of  crimes.  
Page  10  of  22  
  
5   Converging	  virtue	  judgements	  
In  the  context  of  theory-­‐‑choice,  I  suggest  we  interpret  the  above  probabilities  in  the  
following  way.  Let  𝑃(𝑉3)  stand  for  the  probability  of  a  scientist  i  deeming  a  theory  T  
true  on  the  basis  of  some  virtue  V  of  T,  and  let  𝑃(𝑇)  stand  for  the  probability  of  T  
being  true.  Let  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇   then  be  the  conditional  probability  that  T  would  be  correctly  
judged  true  on  the  basis  of  V  by  scientist  i,  and  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇   the  conditional  probability  
of  T  being  incorrectly  judged  true  on  the  basis  of  V  by  scientist  i.  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8   is  then  the  
posterior  probability  of  T  being  true  given  that  it  was  judged  true  on  the  basis  of  V  
by  n  scientists.  If  we  now  take  into  consideration  that  theories  can  be  virtuous  along  
different  dimensions,  then:  
𝑃 𝑇 𝐸 ∙ 𝐶 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝑈 ∙ 𝐹 8 = 11 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑇𝑃 𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 𝐸3 ∙ 𝐶3 ∙ 𝑆3 ∙ 𝑈3 ∙ 𝐹3 ¬𝑇𝑃 𝐸3 ∙ 𝐶3 ∙ 𝑆3 ∙ 𝑈3 ∙ 𝐹3 𝑇 8  
where  𝐸3,  𝐶3,  𝑆3,  𝑈3,  𝐹3  is  a  scientist  i’s  judgement  about  a  theory  being  true  based  on  
that  theory’s  empirical  accuracy,  consistency,  simplicity,  and  fertility,  respectively,  in  
line  with  the  Kuhnian  framework  of  theory  choice.  The  posterior  probability  (the  
left-­‐‑hand  side  of  the  equation)  thus  measures  the  probability  that  a  very  virtuous  
theory  (i.e.,  a  theory  with  all  five  virtues)  is  true,  given  that  it  is  being  judged  true  by  
n  scientists  on  the  basis  of  that  theory  possessing  all  five  virtues.    
Note  that,  just  like  in  the  case  of  the  witnesses  in  Earman’s  equation,  we  are  
assuming  that  scientists’  judgments  about  the  theory’s  truth  on  the  basis  of  its  
virtues  are  fully  independent.  This  follows  directly  from  Kuhn’s  assumption  that  
scientists’  theory-­‐‑choice  preferences  are  subjective  and  diverse  (cf.  Section  3  and  7).  
We  also  assume  that  the  virtues  themselves  are  independent:  a  theory  possessing  
one  virtue  will  not  make  it  more  (or  less)  likely  that  it  possesses  another  virtue.  We’ll  
get  to  that  in  a  moment,  but  regardless  of  whether  the  virtues  are  independent,  so  
long  as  it  is  the  case  that  scientists  are  independent  and  relatively  reliable,  i.e.,  more  
likely  to  judge  a  theory  true  on  the  basis  of  its  virtues  when  it’s  actually  true  (rather  
than  false),  it  will  still  be  the  case  that  when  n  (i.e.,  the  number  of  scientists)  ®  ¥,  the  
posterior  probability  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 	  ®	  1.  With  regards  to  Magnus  and  Callender’s  
challenge,  this  means  that  the  base  rate  of  true  theories  need  not  be  high  for  no-­‐‑
miracles  arguments  like  the  NVC  to  have  any  traction.  What’s  more,  if  n  would  really  
converge  to  infinity,  the  base  rates  could  be  neglected,  as  they  would  be  
diminishingly  small.      
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Of  course,  in  any  realistic  scenario,  the  number  of  scientists  n  will  not  
converge  to  infinity.  Thus  𝑃 𝑇   cannot  be  arbitrarily  small.  Yet  𝑃 𝑇   may  still  be  so  
small  that  the  realist  may  argue  that  despite  our  ignorance  about  the  precise  value  of  
the  base  rates,  the  chances  are  good  that  a  very  virtuous  theory  is  true,  if  only  a  low  𝑃 𝑇   is  granted  by  the  antirealist.  It  will  not  win  the  realist  the  argument  against  a  
very  hard-­‐‑headed  antirealist,  but  it  will  make  the  realist’s  argument  much  more  
unassuming.  And  some  small  value  for  𝑃 𝑇   the  antirealist  must  grant;  otherwise,  the  
Bayesian  formalism  is  simply  ill-­‐‑defined.  We  will  consider  further  objections  in  
Section  7.    
NVC  depends  on  the  Kuhnian  framework  of  theory  choice  in  the  following  
way.  As  we  noted  above  (Section  3),  when  different  theories  have  different  virtues  
and  scientists  different  virtue  preferences,  then  scientists  will  end  up  choosing  
different  theories:  some  might  deem  true  theories  that  are  simple  (but  not  fertile),  
others  might  deem  those  theories  true  which  are  fertile  (but  not  simple),  etc.  On  the  
other  hand,  if  a  theory  does  possess  all  the  virtues,  scientists  will  choose  the  same  
theory  despite  different  virtue  preferences.  In  our  formalism,  we  assume  that  there  is  
a  theory  that  does  possess  all  the  virtues.  Accordingly,  the  formalism  represents  
scientists’  judgements  as  the  joint  probability  that  a  scientist  judges  a  theory  to  be  
true  on  the  basis  of  all  of  the  theory’s  virtues.  And  this  makes  good  sense:  after  all,  it  
is  reasonable  to  assume  that  scientists  judge  a  theory  not  only  on  the  basis  of  the  
virtue  they  prioritize,  but  also  on  the  basis  of  the  other  virtues.  In  a  more  realistic  
representation  of  theory  choice  than  the  one  provided  here,  the  different  virtue  
judgements  would  have  a  weight.  But  since  this  would  complicate  matters  unduly,  
we  shall  refrain  from  incorporating  weights.  It  suffices  for  our  purposes  that  weights  
would  make  a  real  difference  in  theory-­‐‑choice  situations  in  which  there  is  no  theory  
that  possesses  all  the  virtues—situations,  that  is,  which  we  are  not  interested  in  here.    
As  mentioned  above,  we  also  presume  here  that  scientists’  judgements  about  
a  theory’s  truth  on  the  basis  of  that  theory’s  virtues  are  independent.  This  follows  
directly  from  Kuhn’s  assumption  that  scientists’  theory-­‐‑choice  preferences  are  
subjective  and  diverse.  Another  question  is  whether  the  virtues  themselves  are  
independent.  That  is,  is  it  plausible  that  a  theory’s  possessing  one  virtue  does  not  
raise  or  lower  the  probability  of  it  possessing  another  virtue?  I  think  it  is.  Consider  
for  example  simplicity,  fertility,  unifying  power,  and  consistency  in  relation  to  
empirical  accuracy.  It  seems  obvious  that  neither  a  theory’s  simplicity  nor  a  theory’s  
internal  consistency  could  imply  anything  about  empirical  accuracy  (and  vice  versa),  
as  the  latter  is  a  relation  between  the  theory  and  the  world  whereas  simplicity  and  
Page  12  of  22  
  
consistency  are  theory-­‐‑internal  relations.  The  relation  between  empirical  accuracy  
and  the  other  virtues  is  perhaps  less  obvious,  but  I  think  there  is  a  good  case  to  be  
made  for  their  independence  as  well.  Let’s  start  with  fertility.  If  a  theory’s  fertility  
and  theory’s  empirical  accuracy  were  dependent,  then  we  could  infer  one  from  the  
other.  But  that’s  not  the  case.  A  theory  being  empirically  accuracy  doesn’t  tell  us  
whether  or  not  the  theory  has  any  novel  success  (i.e.,  a  form  of  fertility);  in  fact,  
many  theories  in  the  history  of  science  were  empirically  accurate  but  had  no  novel  
success.  Conversely,  a  theory  having  novel  success  with  regard  to  some  phenomena  
doesn’t  tell  us  whether  the  theory  is  empirically  accurate:  there  may  be  phenomena  
(other  than  the  one  the  theory  successfully  predicted)  which  the  theory  does  not  
manage  to  accommodate.  Or  take  unifying  power.  A  theory  accommodating  a  large  
number  of  phenomena  doesn’t  tell  us  whether  the  theory  has  unifying  power:  the  
theory  might  just  be  an  incoherent  conjunction  of  very  narrow  hypotheses.  
Conversely,  a  theory  having  unifying  power  does  not  imply  that  it  is  empirically  
accurate  (e.g.  string  theory  unifies  the  four  fundamental  forces  of  nature  but  is  not  
testable).  Lastly,  a  theory  being  empirically  accurate  with  regards  to  the  empirical  
consequences  that  can  be  derived  from  it  doesn’t  imply  that  it  is  actually  consistent  
with  other  (empirically  accurate)  theories.  The  inconsistency  of  quantum  mechanics  
and  general  relativity  are  prominent  examples.    
Overall  then,  there  are  good  grounds  for  assuming  that  empirical  accuracy  is  
independent  from  all  the  other  virtues.  Similar  points  can  be  made  about  the  
independence  of  the  other  virtues.  The  assumption  that  the  virtues  are  independent  
will  be  required  for  estimating  the  ‘error  rates’  of  scientists’  judgements  for  each  
virtue  separately,  which  we  will  attempt  in  the  next  section.  We  should  stress  again,  
however,  that  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  virtues  are  independent  does  not  
affect  NVC  itself,  as  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 	  ®	  1  when  n®  ¥,  even  when  the  virtues  are  dependent;  
all  that  is  required  is  that  the  scientists’  judgements  are  independent  and  relatively  
reliable  (in  the  sense  specified  above).    
6   Estimating	  the	  error	  rates	  and	  relative	  truth-­‐‑conduciveness	  	  
As  we  saw  in  the  last  section,  for  the  NVC  to  go  through,  scientists’  virtue  judgements  
need  not  be  absolutely  reliable.  They  only  need  to  be  relatively  reliable,  that  is,  the  
true  positive  rate  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇   must  only  be  larger  than  the  false  positive  rate  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇 ,  
but  those  rates  need  not  both  be  low.  Is  that  the  case?  
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In  order  to  address  this  question,  we  shall  exploit  an  interesting  inverse  
relationship  between  the  ‘error  rates’:  a  high  false  positive  rate  implies  a  low  true  
negative  rate  and  vice  versa,  since  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇 = 1 − 𝑃 ¬𝑉3 ¬𝑇 ,  and  a  high  true  
positive  rate  implies  a  low  false  negative  rate  and  vice  versa,  since  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇 ) = 1 −𝑃 ¬𝑉3 𝑇 .16  We  shall  interpret  the  true  negative  rate  𝑃(¬𝑉3|¬𝑇)  as  the  probability  of  a  
scientist  i  to  correctly  judge  a  theory  T  to  be  false  on  the  basis  of  it  not  being  virtuous,  
and  the  false  negative  rate  𝑃(¬𝑉3|𝑇)  as  the  probability  of  scientist  i  to  correctly  judge  
false  a  theory  T  on  the  basis  of  it  not  being  virtuous.  In  what  follows,  we  shall  use  
these  relationships  to  estimate  the  error  rates.  
Although  the  probabilities  scientists  assign  to  a  theory  based  on  its  virtues  
will  of  course  differ  from  one  individual  to  the  other  (in  agreement  with  the  Kuhnian  
picture  of  theory  choice),  an  individual  scientist  judging  a  theory  likely  to  be  true  
when  there  is  no  good  reason  to  (and  vice  versa),  would  amount  to  this  scientist  
being  rational.  The  error  rates  can  thus  be  viewed  as  constraints  on  rational  theory-­‐‑
choice  decisions.      
First  consider  empirical  accuracy.  If  a  theory  is  not  empirically  accurate,  it  
presumably  is  no  candidate  for  being  true:  empirical  accuracy  is  a  necessary  
condition  for  truth.  So  if  a  theory  is  true,  it  would  have  to  be  empirically  accurate,  
and  accordingly  be  judged  empirically  accurate  by  scientists.  Thus,  𝑃 𝐸3 𝑇   must  be  
1.17  On  the  other  hand,  empirically  accurate  theories  may  of  course  simply  save  the  
phenomena  without  being  true.  Thus,  𝑃 𝐸3 ¬𝑇 ,  the  false  positive  rate,  could  in  
principle  also  be  1.  However  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  cannot,  for  if  𝑃 𝐸3 ¬𝑇 = 1,  then  𝑃 ¬𝐸3 ¬𝑇 ,  i.e.,  the  probability  of  a  theory  being  correctly  judged  false  on  the  basis  
of  it  not  being  empirically  accurate  would  be  zero,  because  𝑃 ¬𝐸3 ¬𝑇 = 1 −𝑃 𝐸3 ¬𝑇   (see  above).  But  that  is  extremely  implausible.  Indeed,  a  lack  of  empirical  
accuracy  is  probably  the  best  criterion  scientists  can  go  by  when  judging  a  theory  to  
be  false.  Thus,  𝑃 ¬𝐸3 ¬𝑇   must  have  some  positive  value  and  𝑃 𝐸3 ¬𝑇   accordingly  
a  value  lower  than  1.  Since,  as  determined  above,  𝑃 𝐸3 𝑇 = 1  and  𝑃 𝐸3 ¬𝑇 < 1,  the  
latter  is  lower  than  the  former,  and  we  can  therefore  conclude  that  empirical  
accuracy  is  indeed  relatively  truth-­‐‑conducive.  That  means  that  although  empirical  
accuracy  is  by  no  means  a  guarantee  for  truth  (after  all,  we’re  dealing  here  with  
                                                                                                 
16  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇 	  is  also  known  as  the  sensitivity,  and  𝑃 ¬𝑉3 ¬𝑇   as  the  specificity  of  a  test.      
17  The  empirical  accuracy  of  a  theory  may  not  be  absolute:  the  theory  may  be  empirically  accurate  with  
regards  to  only  some  (but  not  other)  relevant  phenomena.  As  explained  in  Section  3,  in  our  model  of  
theory-­‐‑choice  situation  at  hand,  we  would  then  simply  subdivide  the  virtue  of  empirical  accuracy  into  
empirical   accuracy  with   regards   to   one   set   of   phenomena   and   empirical   accuracy  with   regards   to  
another  set  of  phenomena.    
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probabilities),  and  although  empirical  accuracy  must  not  make  it  even  likely  that  a  
theory  is  true  (i.e.,  it  must  not  even  be  the  case  that  𝑃 𝐸3 𝑇 > .5,  although  here  it  
appears  to  be),  we  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  aforementioned  inverse  
relationships  of  the  error  rates  that  it  is  still  more  likely  that  a  theory  is  empirically  
accurate  when  it  is  true  than  when  it  is  false.  Importantly,  this  does  not  necessarily  
mean  the  converse,  namely  that  a  theory  which  is  empirically  accurate  is  likely  to  be  
true.  This  probability  is  the  probability  of  the  left  hand  side  of  our  Earman  equation  
derived  in  Section  4,  namely  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 ,  and  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  error  rate  𝑃 𝐸3 𝑇 .  
Next  simplicity.  Van  Fraassen  (1980)  and  others  have  argued  that  a  theory’s  
being  simple  gives  us  no  grounds  for  thinking  that  the  theory  is  true  or  likely  to  be  
true.  Although  this  is  generally  accepted,  I  have  provided  reasons  for  the  contrary  
view  in  the  previous  section.  If  we  were  to  assume  that  there  were  indeed  no  good  
grounds  for  simplicity  being  truth-­‐‑indicative,  it  would  not  be  the  case  that  𝑃 𝑆3 𝑇 >𝑃(𝑆3|¬𝑇),  i.e.,  it  would  not  be  the  case  that  the  probability  of  a  scientist  i  correctly  
judging  theory  T  to  be  true  on  the  basis  of  it  being  simple  could  be  larger  than  the  
probability  of  i  falsely  judging  theory  T  to  be  true  on  the  basis  of  it  being  simple.  On  
the  other  hand,  van  Fraassen’s  arguments  of  course  do  not  establish  that  false  
theories  are  bound  to  be  simple  (which  would  translate  to  𝑃 𝑆3 ¬𝑇 = 1),  or  even  
that  false  theories  are  more  likely  to  be  simple  than  true  theories  (which  would  
translate  to   .(G?|0).(G?|¬0) < 1  ).  If  1  is  not  only  the  upper,  but  also  the  lower  limit,  then  .(G?|0).(G?|¬0) = 1,  which  would  cancel  it  out  of  our  Earman  equation  (cf.  Section  5).18  
Let  us  now  turn  to  unifying  power.  Theories  that  have  been  singled  out  as  
approximately  true  by  the  realists  generally  manage  to  unify  the  phenomena.  
Einstein’s  theory  of  relativity,  the  standard  model  of  particle  physics,  the  modern  
synthesis  in  evolutionary  biology,  plate  tectonics  etc.  are  cases  in  point.  Thus  a  true  
theory,  for  the  realist,  is  likely  to  unify  and  therefore  𝑃 𝑈3 𝑇 ,  i.e.,  the  probability  of  a  
theory  being  correctly  judged  true  on  the  basis  of  it  unifying  the  phenomena  should  
approach  1.  Of  course,  the  antirealist  may  want  to  doubt  that  a  theory  is  likely  to  
unify  if  true,  i.e.,  she  may  want  to  insist  that  𝑃 ¬𝑈3 𝑇   is  low,  which  would,  
according  to  the  error-­‐‑rate  relations  mentioned  above,  drive  down  the  “realist’s”  𝑃 𝑈3 𝑇 .  But  that  would  imply  that  it  is  likely  that  true  theories  will  not  be  
                                                                                                 
18  Forster  and  Sober  (1994)and  Hitchcock  and  Sober  (2004)  argue  that  simpler  models  are  more  likely  to  
accurately  predict  data  than  more  complex  ones.  Whether  these  results  extrapolate  to  theories,  which  
the  realism  debate  is  about,  is  questionable.  
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recognized  as  true  by  virtue  of  their  unifying  power.  Since  the  realist  holds  high  
unifying  power  as  a  mark  of  truth,  it  may  be  that  there  are  many  more  true  theories  
out  there  that  are  unrecognized.  But  that  wouldn’t  be  a  problem  for  the  realist.  She  
only  wants  to  make  sure  that  she  has  good  grounds  for  believing  in  the  truth  of  
those  theories  to  which  she  does  commit.  The  antirealist  would  therefore  need  to  
give  us  some  reason  for  driving  down  𝑃 𝑈3 𝑇   other  than  that  it  wins  her  the  
argument.  I  can’t  see  such  an  independent  argument.  The  realist,  on  the  other  hand,  
seems  to  have  an  argument  for  𝑃 𝑈3 𝑇   being  high:  it  simply  makes  sense  (not  only  
from  a  historical  perspective)  that  theories  will  unify  the  phenomena,  if  they  are  
supposed  to  be  genuine  truth-­‐‑candidates.  With  regards  to  the  false  positive  rate,  𝑃 𝑈3 ¬𝑇 ,  it  seems  glaringly  obvious  that  false  theories  have  only  rarely,  if  ever,  
achieved  the  kinds  of  unification  that  have  regularly  been  accomplished  by  theories  
like  the  ones  above.  It  seems  then  safe  to  assume  that  𝑃 𝑈3 ¬𝑇 < 𝑃 𝑈3 𝑇 ,  as  
required  by  the  Earman  equation.      
Consider  consistency  next.  Kuhn  lumps  together  internal  and  external  
consistency.  And  yet  they  are  best  treated  separately.  Let’s  start  with  internal  
consistency.  Clearly,  a  true  theory  must  be  internally  consistent  (for  short:  𝐶H?),  i.e.,    𝑃 𝐶H? 𝑇   must  be  1,  which  means  that  the  false  negative  rate  must  be  zero.  On  the  
other  hand,  the  false  positive  rate  𝑃 𝐶H? ¬𝑇   is  much  more  difficult  to  assess.  There  
are  probably  indefinitely  many  false  theories  out  there  that  are  internally  consistent.  
But  there  will  also  be  as  least  as  many  false  theories  that  are  not  even  consistent.  We  
also  know  that  𝑃 ¬𝐶H? ¬𝑇 = 1 − 𝑃 𝐶H? ¬𝑇 ,  so  𝑃 ¬𝐶H? ¬𝑇   and  𝑃 𝐶H? ¬𝑇   cannot  
both  be  equal  to  1,  or  be  close  to  1.  In  the  face  of  our  ignorance  about  the  precise  
values,  it  seems  most  reasonable  to  set  both  expressions  to  .5.  That  would  give  us  𝑃 𝐶H? ¬𝑇 < 𝑃 𝐶H? 𝑇   in  conformity  with  the  requirement  of  the  Earman  equation.    
Now  consider  external  consistency  (𝐶I?).  True  theories  must  be  consistent  
with  our  background  knowledge  (Boyd  1983,  Lipton  1991/2004,  Psillos  1999).  Thus  𝑃(𝐶I? 𝑇 = 1  and  accordingly  the  false  negative  rate  𝑃(¬𝐶I? 𝑇   would  have  to  be  
zero.  What  about  the  false  positive  rate  𝑃(𝐶I? ¬𝑇 ,  i.e.,  the  probability  that  a  theory  is  
judged  true  on  the  basis  of  it  being  externally  consistent  if  it  is  actually  false?  
Although  there  are  probably  many  false  theories  that  are  consistent  with  our  
background  knowledge,  there  are  at  least  as  many  (but  probably  many  more)  false  
theories  that  are  inconsistent  with  our  background  knowledge,  which  would  mean  
that  𝑃(¬𝐶I? ¬𝑇   will  approach  1.  But  since  𝑃 𝐶I? ¬𝑇 = 1 − 𝑃 ¬𝐶I? ¬𝑇 ,  (𝑃(𝐶I? ¬𝑇   
would  then  approach  0.  In  that  case  our  condition  of  𝑃(𝐶I? ¬𝑇 < 𝑃(𝐶I? 𝑇   seems  to  
be  well  satisfied.    
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Lastly,  consider  fertility.  As  mentioned  above,  fertility  is  standardly  construed  
in  terms  of  novel  success.  And  the  capacity  to  predict  novel  phenomena  is  indeed  the  
virtue  most  cherished  by  the  realist.19  These  days  it  is  in  fact  treated  as  a  necessary  
condition  for  taking  a  theory  to  be  true.  Thus,  𝑃 𝐹3 𝑇 = 1.  Conversely,  realists  
consider  false  theories  very  unlikely  to  generate  successful  novel  predictions,  thus  𝑃 𝐹3 ¬𝑇   ought  to  be  close  to  zero.  The  condition  for  our  Earman  equation  is  again  
well  satisfied.  If  the  antirealist  wishes  to  challenge  this,  she  would  have  to  present  
evidence  as  to  false  theories  being  capable  of  producing  novel  success.  For  that  it  
won’t  be  enough  to  present  a  handful  of  cases  where  false  theories  allegedly  
produced  novel  success  (Laudan  1981).  Not  only  need  there  be  a  more  substantial  
data  base,  but  also  must  the  antirealist  make  a  case  for  the  theory’s  false  posits  being  
responsible  for  novel  success  (Psillos  1999).  This  has  not  yet  been  achieved  to  any  
persuasive  degree.  In  fact,  by  virtue  of  a  logical  point  made  by  Vickers  (2013),  it  
appears  that  the  realist  can  remain  rather  relaxed  about  allegedly  threatening  cases.20  
Thus,  as  it  stands,  the  realist  is  in  a  good  position  to  demand  that  𝑃 𝐹3 ¬𝑇   be  kept  at  
a  low  level.  This  once  again  would  give  us  𝑃 𝐹3 ¬𝑇 < 𝑃 𝐹3 𝑇   in  accord  with  our  
requirement.    
In  sum  then,  it  appears  that  for  almost  all  theoretical  virtues  considered  here  
(except  perhaps  simplicity),  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇 < 𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇   holds  and  that  therefore  our  NVC,  
based  on  the  Earman  convergence  equation,  against  the  antirealist  succeeds:  for  n  ®  ¥,  .(>?|¬0).(>?|0) 8  ®  0,  and  therefore  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8   ®  1,  regardless  of  the  value  of  𝑃(𝑇).  Less  
formally,  since  the  false  positive  rate  is  smaller  than  the  true  positive  rate,  the  more  
scientists  embrace  a  theory  on  the  basis  of  its  virtues,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  it  is  
true,  even  when  the  base  rates  of  true  theories  is  very  small.  As  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇   need  not  be  
>.5  for  this  argument  to  go  through,  this  means  that  the  realist  can  assume  that  the  
theoretical  virtues  are  only  minimally  truth-­‐‑conducive  (so  that  𝑃 𝑉3 ¬𝑇 < 𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇 ).  
                                                                                                 
19  Some  prominent  examples  are  the  prediction  of  light  bending  by  Einstein’s  theory  of  relativity,  the  
prediction  of  the  white  spot  by  Poisson  on  the  basis  of  the  wave  theory  of  light,  and  the  prediction  of  
chemical  elements  by  Mendeleev.  What  makes  these  predictions  impressive  is  their  quality,  rather  
than  their  quantity:  to  say  it  with  Popper,  the  respective  theories  “took  a  high  risk”  of  being  wrong.  
There  are  several  notions  of  novelty.  A  popular  one  is  so-­‐‑called  “use-­‐‑novelty”.  For  a  recent  discussion  
see  blinded  reference.    
20  Vickers  points  out  that  “just  because  a  posit  is  definitely  ‘derivation  internal’,  and  plays  an  obvious  
and  explicit  role  in  the  derivation  of  interest,  does  not  thereby  make  it  a  ‘working  posit’  to  which  
realists  are  obliged  to  make  a  commitment”  (204).  This  is  so  because,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  wrong  
working  posits  can  always  contain  true  posits  that  are  responsible  for  the  novel  success.  This  lesson,  
Vickers  admits,  applies  as  much  to  a  prima  facie  rather  compelling  case  discussed  by  himself  and  his  
collaborator  (Saatsi  and  Vickers  2011)  as  to  any  other.  
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In  fact,  we  argued  in  this  section  that  the  theoretical  virtues  are  indeed  truth-­‐‑
conducive  in  this  minimal  sense.  
7   Objections	  and	  clarifications	  
It  should  be  obvious  by  now  that  the  correct  estimates  of  the  error  rates  are  crucial  
for  the  NVC  argument  for  realism  to  have  any  force.  Although  we  sought  to  set  the  
error  rates  with  a  great  deal  of  charity  (consider  e.g.  simplicity),  the  antirealist  might  
nevertheless  have  specific  objections  to  how  we  set  the  error  rates.  Such  objections  
are  not  necessarily  bad  news  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper.  On  the  contrary,  as  this  
paper  sought  to  undermine  Magnus  and  Callender’s  claim  that  the  realism  debate  is  
irrational,  pointed  objections  against  the  way  the  error  rates  are  set  would  actually  
support  the  conclusions  of  the  current  paper,  as  they  would  be  evidence  for  a  
rational  debate.  And  although  it  might  be  over-­‐‑optimistic  to  expect  that  the  realist  
and  the  antirealist  will  come  to  any  agreements  (as  it  is  usually  the  case  in  
philosophy),  arguments  about  the  error  rates  would  be  decidedly  more  tractable  
than  arguments  about  the  base  rates.    
   It  is  worth  recalling  that  we  already  established  that  the  antirealist  cannot  
undermine  the  NVC  by  simply  setting  the  base  rates  to  zero:  that  would  render  the  
formalism  ill-­‐‑defined.  It  is  however  widely  accepted  that  the  NMA  is  suitably  
expressed  in  Bayesian  terms.  There  is  another  reason  why  the  antirealist  cannot  help  
herself  to  such  an  escape:  the  antirealist  is  a  skeptic,  not  a  dogmatist.  That  is,  
antirealists  think  we  have  no  good  reason  to  believe  that  our  theories  are  true,  not  
that  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  our  theories  are  false.  However,  setting  the  
base  rates  to  zero  would  mean  insisting  that  virtuous  theories  are  bound  to  be  false.    
   There  is  a  more  severe  problem  for  the  argument  presented  in  this  paper.  As  
mentioned  above,  the  number  of  scientists  n  can  of  course  not  go  to  infinity;  the  size  
of  the  scientific  community  is  limited  at  any  given  time.  Accordingly,  there  will  be  
values  for  the  base  rate  	  𝑃 𝑇   for  which  it  will  no  longer  be  the  case  that  it  is  likely  
that  a  theory  is  true  when  very  virtuous,  i.e.,  it  will  no  longer  be  the  case  that  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 > .5—as  the  realist  would  like  to  have  it.  The  antirealist  could  thus  simply  
adopt  values  for  𝑃 𝑇 ,  which  prevent  the  NVC  to  go  through.  It  would  seem  that  
Magnus  and  Callender’s  observation  would  then  still  hold.  At  the  very  least,  
however,  such  a  move  by  the  antirealist  would  be  utterly  ad  hoc,  if  not  question-­‐‑
begging:  the  antirealist  would  have  no  other  motivation  for  setting  her  base  rates  
than  to  avoid  the  realist’s  argument  to  go  through.  The  antirealist  would  thus  
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damage  the  possibility  of  a  rational  debate  about  the  error  rates,  when  such  debate  is  
clearly  available.    
   Although  the  number  of  scientists  n  is  not  going  to  converge  to  infinity,  it  is  
still  the  case  on  my  account  that  the  more  scientists  embrace  a  theory,  the  more  likely  
it  is  to  be  correct.  One  might  consider  this  to  be  counterintuitive.  However,  I’m  
happy  to  embrace  this  consequence  of  my  account.  After  all,  I  do  believe  it  is  
plausible  that  a  theory,  which  is  subjected  to  more  scrutiny  when  assessed  by  a  bigger  
scientific  community,  is  less  likely  to  be  false  when  accepted  as  true  by  capable  
scientists:  the  probability  that  the  scientists  in  questions  are  mistaken  (e.g.,  because  
they  are  mistaken  about  the  empirical  support  the  theory  enjoys)  is  simply  lower,  the  
more  critical  eyes  there  are.    
   Although  I  do  claim  that  virtue  convergence  enables  scientists  with  diverse  
virtue  preferences  to  choose  the  same  theory  and  that  such  virtue  convergence  gives  
us  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  theory  in  question  is  true,  I  must  emphasise  that  I  
do  not  claim  that  virtue  convergence  is  necessary  for  realist  commitments.  In  other  
words,  I  wouldn’t  want  to  deny  that  a  realist  attitude  can  be  warranted  also  in  cases  
in  which  there  is  no  virtue  convergence.  For  example,  there  could  be  cases  where  the  
vast  majority  of  scientists  choose  a  theory  T1  possessing  a  single  virtue  V1  instead  of  
another  theory  T2  that  possesses  several  virtues,  say,  V2,  V3,  and  V4.21  Whilst  I  
admit  the  possibility  of  such  scenarios,  my  formalism  could  not  accommodate  such  a  
case,  because  it  presumes  that  the  theory  under  consideration  possesses  all  the  
virtues.  In  fact,  I’m  not  even  sure  such  a  case  ought  to  be  accommodated,  as  it  is  not  
quite  compatible  with  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory-­‐‑choice  according  to  which  
scientists’  theory-­‐‑choice  preference  are  diverse;  this  rules  out  situations  in  which  a  
majority  of  scientists  jointly  spurns  several  virtues  in  favour  of  the  same  single  virtue.  
Regardless  of  the  Kuhnian  picture  of  theory-­‐‑choice,  it  just  seems  odd  that  scientists  
would  embrace  a  theory  with  just  a  single  virtue  rather  than  one  with  several  ones.  
But  once  again,  I  would  not  want  to  deny  that  there  may  be  other  good  grounds  for  
taking  a  realist  attitude  towards  theories;  it  is  thus  no  part  of  my  picture  that  virtue  
convergence  is  necessary  for  realist  commitments.    
   One  may  fear  that  the  argument  proposed  here  on  the  basis  of  the  Kuhnian  
framework  of  theory-­‐‑choice  invites  relativism.  My  argument  suggests  that  we  be  
realists  about  theories  that  are  held  to  be  true  by  numerous  scientists  on  the  basis  of  
the  theory’s  virtues.  Does  that  not  subject  us  to  the  risk  that  scientists,  at  some  point  
                                                                                                 
21  I  thank  one  of  the  referees  of  this  paper  for  raising  this  possibility.    
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in  time,  embrace  a  theory  as  true  that  turns  out  false  in  the  end?  More  importantly,  
does  that  not  render  realism  relative  to  a  social  group  at  a  particular  time?  My  
answer  to  both  questions  is  ‘yes’.  Yet  relativism  does  not  follow.  First  of  all,  I,  like  
most  philosophers,  subscribe  to  fallibilism.  That  is,  we  should  never  think  that  we  
possess  the  ultimately  true  theory  that  will  remain  with  us  forever.  There  is  always  
the  possibility  that  nature  will  teach  us  better.  Since  my  argument  is  a  probabilistic  
one,  this  possibility  is  always  there.  A  theory  embraced  by  numerous  scientists  on  
the  basis  of  it  being  very  virtuous  makes  it  very  likely  that  the  theory  is  true.  It  
doesn’t  guarantee  it.  Second,  although  my  argument  is  relative  to  scientists’  
judgements,  it  is  so  in  an  unproblematic  way.  For  one,  the  judgements  are,  as  I  
explained  in  Section  3,  grounded  in  the  actual  virtues  of  the  theories.  So  there  clearly  
is  an  objective  basis  for  these  judgements.  For  another,  as  I  argued  in  Section  6,  my  
account  puts  constraints  on  the  nature  of  these  judgements.  It  is  therefore  not  any  
community’s  judgements  that  can  serve  as  basis  for  my  argument.  Rather,  the  
judgements  are  rationally  constrained  ones.    
Another  objection  to  the  NVC  might  be  to  question  whether  the  community  of  
scientists  would  really  be  diverse  enough  for  the  individual  scientists  to  make  
independent  theory-­‐‑choice  decisions.  Isn’t  it  in  fact  the  case  that  on  the  Kuhnian  
picture  of  theory  choice,  a  scientific  community  is  under  the  strong  influence  of  a  
paradigm,  ensuring  concord  amongst  the  scientists’  decisions?  First  of  all,  in  Kuhn’s  
view,  scientists  are  under  the  influence  of  a  paradigm  only  in  periods  of  normal  
science.  But  theory-­‐‑choice  is  most  relevant  in  periods  of  revolution,  where  paradigm  
(theories)  are  changed.  In  these  periods,  there  clearly  is  diversity  of  judgements  in  
Kuhn’s  view.  Second,  Kuhn  in  fact  believed  that  scientists’  divergent  weighting  
preferences  would  go  some  way  to  guarantee  a  right  balance  between  conservatism  
and  innovation  throughout  the  development  of  science  (Kuhn  1977,  363).  Thus,  even  
in  periods  of  agreement  on  a  paradigm,  scientists’  individual  preferences  might  
diverge.  Their  agreement  despite  these  divergences,  as  I  argued  above  (Section  3),  is  
explicable  when  there  is  virtue  convergence.    
   Let’s  turn  to  a  different  aspect.  The  NVC  assumes  that  scientists  make  
judgements  about  the  truth  of  a  theory  on  the  basis  of  its  virtues.  But  why  should  we  
presume  that  scientists  make  such  judgements  rather  than  merely  acceptance  
judgements,  which  do  not  require  any  commitment  from  them  regarding  the  truth  of  
a  theory?  On  the  contrary,  is  it  not  more  plausible  that  scientists  normally  do  not  
make  such  commitments?  In  fact,  I’m  happy  to  say  that  scientists  need  not  have  any  
commitments  about  the  truth  of  a  theory,  so  I’m  happy  to  accept  that  what  I  referred  
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to  as  “scientists’  judgements  about  the  truth  of  a  theory”  can  be  construed  minimally  
so  that  they  amount  to  no  more  than  judgements  about  empirical  adequacy  in  van  
Fraassen’s  sense,  that  is,  a  theory’s  truth  concerning  observables  in  the  past,  present,  
and  future  (van  Fraassen  1980).  I  therefore  want  to  keep  apart  the  truth  in  the  context  
of  scientists’  judgements,  i.e.,  𝑃(𝑉3),  from  the  truth  of  the  theory  𝑃(𝑇).  So  a  scientist  
might  judge  a  theory  only  empirically  adequate  (and  not  true)  on  the  basis  of  that  
theory’s  virtue,  but  still  we  might,  as  we  did,  take  this  judgement  as  evidence  for  the  
truth  of  a  theory,  namely  𝑃 𝑇 𝑉8 .  More  fundamentally,  it  might  still  be  justified  to  
think  that  a  theory  is  likely  to  have  certain  virtues  if  true  (and  accordingly,  be  judged  
true  (in  a  deflationary  sense),  i.e.,  𝑃 𝑉3 𝑇 ),  as  we  argued  in  Section  6.      
Finally,  one  might  object  that  scientists’  judgements  about  a  theory’s  truth  based  
on  its  virtues,  contrary  to  what  I  assumed  above,  should  be  sensitive  to  degrees  of  
‘virtueness’.  That  is,  in  reality,  theories  are  not  just  simple  or  not  simple,  empirically  
accurate  or  not,  unifying  or  conjunctive,  etc.,  but  rather  more  or  less  simple,  
empirically  accurate  etc.  But  we  can  happily  admit  that  our  assumption  that  
judgements  are  binary  is  indeed  an  idealization.  Reality  is  regularly  more  complex  
than  our  representations  of  it.  I  think  it  would  be  foolish,  however,  to  conclude  that  
our  argument  for  this  reason  alone  is  therefore  meaningless.  That  would  make  large  
parts  of  science,  in  which  idealization  looms  large,  meaningless  too.  Although  the  
judgements  the  NVC  is  based  on  are  perhaps  more  fine-­‐‑grained  than  supposed  here,  I  
can’t  see  that  this  would  undermine  the  basic  argument.  
8   Conclusion	  
In  this  paper  I  argued,  with  the  help  of  a  point  made  by  Earman  in  the  case  of  
converging  witness  reports  and  by  presuming  the  Kuhnian  framework  of  theory  
choice,  that  a  convergence  of  a  significant  number  of  scientists’  judgements  about  a  
very  virtuous  theory  being  true  will  make  it  very  likely  that  the  theory  is  true,  almost  
regardless  of  the  base  rates.  Although,  for  reasons  to  do  with  the  finite  amount  of  
scientists  embracing  a  theory  at  any  particular  time,  this  cannot  be  a  blanket  victory  
for  the  realist,  my  argument  still  tilts  the  balance  in  favour  of  the  realist.    
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